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SPA TIA L P R IC E  C O M P E T IT IO N  
W IT H  U N IN FO R M E D  B U Y ERS
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March 1989
A B ST R A C T
In the present paper we study price rivalry among firms selling their prod­
uct at different locations in space, to buyers who are imperfectly informed about 
prevailing prices. Spatial dispersion of sellers naturally supports the hypothesis 
that buyers have imperfect knowledge of prices : whence the idea of combining 






















































































































































































1. IN T R O D U C T IO N
The two approaches have been initiated, the first by Hotelling (1929) and the 
second by Stigler (1961). Combining these two approaches, Gabszewicz and Garella 
(1986) have studied a model with two firms located along a linear market, with con­
sumers who know the price quoted by their nearest seller, but ignore the price at the 
more distant shop. However these consumers can obtain full information about price 
at a cost which is positively related to the distance separating them from the supplier. 
The main result of that paper shows that, at a noncooperative price equilibrium, the 
two firms must announce the highest among the prices which induce no search from 
any customer.
In the following pages, we extend the above analysis to a linear market in which 
more than two firms are located. After having summarized the two firm-case in 
Section 2, we consider in Section 3 a situation with n firms symmetrically located, 
and characterize a noncooperative price equilibrium. Our findings confirm that the 
result obtained for the two firm-case extends to the n firm-symmetric case : price 
competition can stabilize only when all firms quote the same price, which again does 
not induce any customer to undertake search. In order to analyze the role played 
by symmetry in this result, we develop in Section 4 the equilibrium analysis with 
three firms asymmetrically located. In contrast, this asymmetry may generate a new 
type of price equilibrium, involving price dispersion and consumers’ search. Having 
characterized the nature of a price equilibrium in a general framework, we consider in 
Section 5 the issue of its existence by means of an example; again we shall distinguish 
there between the n firm-symmetric case and the 3 firm-asymmetrie case. In the last 




























































































2. T H E  C A SE OF TW O  FIRM S
Consider two sellers, 1 and 2, located, respectively, at points x\ and x2 of a linear 
market [0. L\ uniformly covered with potential customers t, t € [0.L] (see Figure 1).
Ai a2
0 X! i12 x2 L
Figure 1
We shall suppose that the buyers located closer to seller 1 (the interval [0 , 112] =  ^ 1) 
than to seller 2, know his price pi, but ignore the price p2 quoted by seller 2. Similarly, 
those customers located closer to seller 2 than to seller 1 (the interval [<12, L\ = A2]) 
are assumed to know seller 2’s, but not seller Ts price. The interval Ai is called the 
natural market of seller i, i =  1,2. Finally we shall assume that, for any buyer t, it is 
possible to learn the unknown price by paying a search cost which increases with the 
distance separating this buyer from the more distant shop. On the other hand, sellers 
are assumed to know the information structure we have just described; furthermore, 
they choose their price non cooperatively.






























































































On this figure we have represented the highest price a consumer is willing to accept 
from the seller in his natural market, without searching for the other price : we call 
this highest price his “reservation price-’. Whenever the known price exceeds his 
reservation price, consumer t prefers to incur the information cost and postpone his 
decision to buy. Let p[(t) (resp. po(0) denote the reservation price for t G Ai  (resp. 
t G A2). We notice that the closer is a consumer t to t\n ~ the consumer at the border 
between the two natural markets -, the lower is his reservation price. This pattern 
reflects the assumption that search costs are increasing with distance : the consumers 
with the highest incentive to search are those located close to the border between the 
natural markets.
Now let us show that the only pair of prices which can constitute a price equilib­
rium is given by (p‘ ,pm) with p' =  p[(t 12) = p2(i 12)- Let us proceed by elimination. 
First of all, no pair of prices at which one of the sellers would quote a price strictly 
smaller than p‘ can be an equilibrium : this seller could increase his price without 
loosing customers from his natural market, since none of them is searching at such a 
low price. This increase in price entails an increase in profits, a contradiction. Now 
consider a pair of prices (pi,p2) such as depicted on Figure 2. Denote by r 1>2(pi) 
(resp. r 2il(p2)) that consumer who is indifferent between buying from firm 1 (resp. 
firm 2) at price pi) (resp. p2), and searching. All those customers in the interval 
]t"i ,2 (Pi) t ~2,i(P2 )[ decide to search and thus notice that p2 is smaller than p\\ accord­
ingly they buy from firm 1. At prices (pi,p2) demand to firm 1 (resp. firm 2) is 
thus equal to D i(p i,p2) =  r li2(pi) (resp. D2(pi,p2) = L -  rit2(pi)). It is clear that 
LMP1 .P2 ) is inelastic in the domain ]p2 ,Pi[- Accordingly, seller 2 can increase his 
price without loosing customers, again a contradiction to the fact that such a pair 
of prices (p i,p2) would constitute a price equilibrium. This excludes any equilibrium 
with both prices exceeding p ' and p; 9= py. Finally no pair of prices (p i, P2 ) with 
pi =  p2 > p ' can be an equilibrium. Jn that case, indeed, all customers in the inter­
val ]rli2(pi), r 2il(p2)[ know both prices, and can be captured by any seller who could 
undercut slightly the common price, thereby increasing his profit, which is not accept­
able at a price equilibrium. Thus it follows from the above reasoning that the only 
remaining pair of prices which can be a candidate for a price equilibrium is (p",p‘ ). 
In the following section we show that this characterization of equilibrium extends to 
the n-firm symmetric case, i.e. when there are n firms each of which having a natural 




























































































3. T H E  n-FIR M  SY M M ET R IC  CASE
Consider an industry embodying n firms equally spaced at locations x i, • • •, Xj,
• • •, zn, with z i = X2 = x\ + , Xj = Xj- 1  t  -  Symmetric locations of this
kind imply that the natural market of each firm j,  Aj, is of length We define also 
t j j+i  as the border between the natural markets Aj and Aj+1 ; i.e., tj,j+i = Xj -r 4%.
By analogy with the previous section, we define, for t 6  Aj,  p~j{t) as the reserva­
tion price of consumer t. We assume that pj(t) is a strictly increasing function of the 
distance 11 — Xj\. Furthermore we assume that pj(t) is a continuous function of t.
From the symmetry assumption, it is easy to see that Pj(tjj+1) =  P*(U,jb+i) for 
all j, it; we shall denote this common value by p". For convenience, denote by p i- 
the (n — l)-dimensional vector which has p‘ as components, the j th component being 
omitted. Let us analyze the demand function Dj{p',p-j) for an “interior” firm j  when 
all its rivals quote the price p“. Figure 3 helps understanding the following discussion.
Figure 3
Clearly, for all j ,  j  =  2, • • •, n -  1, Dj(p\p’_j ) =  £ if p < pm. Then use the notation 
r;'.;'+i(Pj) (resp. Tjj-i(pj))  to represent the consumer located in seller j's  natural 
market who, at price pj is indifferent between buying from seller j  or searching at 
seller j  + 1 (resp. j  — 1). Given the continuity of pj(t)> rj,j+i(p;') *s we^ defined 




























































































if P > Pi max ; 
if Pj max > P > P"; 
if P < P~ ■
As for the two "exterior” firms, 1 and n, the demand function -  say, for firm 1, -  are 
defined as follows for p'_v :
if P > Pi maxi 
if Pi max > P > P' ; 
if P < P" ■
The demand function for firm n can be analogously defined, allowing for obvious 
changes in the subscripts. From continuity of.pj(t), it follows easily that the demand 
functions Dj(p-,p'_j) are also continuous, j  = Further notice that, for all
p > pm, we have D \{p \pm_ ])  > Dj(p\ pl-)f j  = 2, •••,n  — 1. Indeed, at each price 
exceeding p‘ , firm 1 has no competitor on its left, while any interior firm looses 
customers on both sides of its natural market when it quotes a price p exceeding p~ 
and its neighbors quote p". Moreover, it follows from symmetry that all interior firms 
have identical demand functions Dj(p-,p'_j), j  = 2, • • •, n — 1.
Consider now the demand function of firm j  at any (n — l)-price vector p_;-. One 
of the properties we shall use in the sequel is that Dj(p;p~j) is a function of p only 
as long as p > max{p;-_1;p;+1}. In fact, when a firm quotes a price exceeding those 
of its neighbors, it captures only those customers from its natural market who do not 
search.
The profit function IIj (p; p l ;-) of an interior firm is defined by
Dj(p;plj) = p • Dj(p\p\j) .
II;- is a continuous, bounded function on the compact interval [0,py max]- Accordingly 
Ylj reaches its maximum on this interval. We shall assume henceforth that this max­
imum is unique and we denote it by p\fj.  Obviously, since II7-(p; pLj) =  p • £  is linear 
increasing in p in the domain [0 , p"], p\ t j  is either equal to, or strictly larger than 
p*, for j  =  2, - • •, n — 1. As for the two exterior firms, again, IIi and ITn are also 
continuous, bounded functions on [0 ,p imax] and reaches a maximum, assumed to be 





j  =  2, • • •, n — 1. Then, for j  =  2, ■ • •, n — I,
Dj(p\p lj)  =  0,



























































































L E M M A  1.
i) I f  p =  p' , then the n-tuple (p" , • ■ •, p" , ■ • •, pm) is a price equilibrium.
ii) I f  (p‘ , ■ ■ ■ , p ' , ■ ■ ■ ,pm) is a price equilibrium, then p =  p ' .
P roof. First it follows immediately from the definition of p and the assumption that 
p = p ' that, for any firm j,  p" is a best reply against p“_j which proves (i). Next 
suppose, contradicting (ii), that (p", • .?") is a price equilibrium and chat p > p ' . 
Then there would exist at least one firm j  such that
n > n,(p';? \ j )
a contradiction to the assumption that (p‘ , • • • , p ')  is a price equilibrium. ■
LEM M A  2. If  p = p", then (pm, ■ ■ ■ ,p") is the unique price equilibrium.
P roof. Suppose, contrary to the proposition, that (p i,-- - ,p n) 7̂  (p‘ , ••• ,? ’ ) is a 
price equilibrium and that p = p“. First, for at least one j,  p‘ < pj. Then it is readily 
verified that it cannot be the case that pj = pj+ 1 > p’ (or p,-_i =  py > p*) for any 
j; otherwise the two adjacent firms could undercut each other’s price. It follows that 
at the supposed equilibrium there should be at least one firm quoting a price strictly 
larger than those of its neighbors. Without loss of generality, suppose it was the 
interior firm k\ then Dk(pk\P-k) =  ^fc(Pfc;plfc) < D(pm). But then, Tfc(pfc;p_fc) = 
Pk ■ D{p]i\p‘_k) < p~ Dip") where the last inequality follows from the assumption that 
p = p“. Since playing p" affords firm j  with a profit equal to p‘ D(pm), V p_ i, then one 
obtains a contradiction wich the hypothesis that (p i,---,pn ) is a price equilibrium. 
Therefore, if p =  p ' no equilibrium different from (p", • - - , p“, - - • , p“) exists, but by 
Lemma 1, p = p* implies that (p", • - - ,p“, • • • ,p“) is indeed an equilibrium, which 
completes the proof. ■
Consider a price vector p such that pi > P2 > P3 - Define o(pi) =  112 -  ri.2(Pi)- 
Then, to shorten notation, for such a vector of prices and p in ]p2 ,Pi(, let us write 
D \ (p, po) for D i(p;p_i) and D ^p i.p ) for DoCpjp-o). Figure 4 illustrates the situation, 





























































































*1 I *12 x2 J '23 *3 '34
tii»  ^p)
Figure 4
LEM M A  3. For given prices Pi > po > P3 and for p in ]p2 ,Pi[ 
D \(p ,h )  =  0 : (pi,j>) - a ( p i ) .
P roof. First notice that for po >  P3 and p in ]p2,Pi[, r li2(p) =  ~2,3(p) — *12- Also, 
7*1,2 < ^12 < 7”2 ,3 » and
O i(p ,h ) °= n,2(p)-
Then,
D'Ap u p ) =  ^ ( p )  -  'is  +  *n -  n .2 (p)
=  *l.2 (p) +  “ (Pl)
= Di(P.P) +  “ (Pi)-
The above lemma allows us to write, for Pi > p. > P3 and p in ]p., p,[ the profit 
functions
*i(p,P2 ) = p - Di(p,pi)
*i(p\,p) = p- D?(pi,p).
LEM M A  4. If  the n-tupie (pi,-- - ,pn) is a price equilibrium, then no firm can be 



























































































P roof. Assume that some firm j  would quote a price strictly lower than its neighbors 
at an equilibrium. Then raising its price does not change its demand, but increases 
its profit, a contradiction.
LEM M A  5. If (pi, ■ - pn) is a price equilibrium, then px = p2 = p '.
P roof, pi < p2 is excluded by Lemma 4; p\ = P2 > P~ is impossible because otherwise 
each firm would undercut each other. Then, either p2 < pi or p" =  pi =  p2. But 
p2 < Pi is also impossible : first notice that, if p2 < pi, then P3 < p2, by Lemma 4. 
Furthermore, by Lemma 3,
v  p 6  ] p . , P i [ , pDi(puPi)  =  pD2(Pi, P2) -  pa(p 1 )
or, equivalently,
*i(Pi,P3) =  -  p a(p\).
Recall that (-) and tt2(-) are continuous and single-peacked functions on ]p2 ,Pi[- 
Furthermore, by definition,
pi = argmax * i(p i,p2).
Thus, V e > 0 such that p2 +  e < p i , one can find an e' > 0 such that pi — e' > p2 +  s, 
satisfying
* l(P l- z \ h )  > M P l+ ^ .P l )
or, using Lemma 3,
M P l . P i  -  s') -  (Pi -  s')<*(Pi) >  M P 1 . P 1  + « ) -  (.Pi +  s)<*(Pi)-
Consequently, rearranging the terms, we obtain
M P l . P l  -  S') ~  *2(Pl,P2 +  S) >  [pi -  S' -  (p2 +  s)]<*(pl ) >  0 .
Since the inequality above is verified for each e sufficiently small (and for each corre­
sponding e'), then the continuity of t2(-) implies that
M P i .P i  -  s') >  M P l. P l )



























































































L E M M A  6. I f  the set o f price equilibria is nonempty, it includes (p‘ , ■ ■ ■, p“, ■ • • , p ') .
Pi-oof. Let (pi, • ■ ■, Pn) be a price equilibrium. Then we know from Lemma 5 that 
Pi — P'1 — P"■ Let us show that po = p" is a best reply against p\ — pz — p". First, for 
ail p > p*. pDi[p, p") > pD?(pm ,p ,p ‘ ) since D i(p ,p ') > £>o(p’ . p. p“). Furthermore, 
by symmetry, Di(pm,pm) = Diip’ ,pm ,pm) =  Since p ' is a best reply for firm 1
when firm 2 quotes p ' , a fortiori, firm 2 cannot increase its profits if firms 1 and 3 
quote p". This argument can be extended by symmetry to all interior firms. Again by 
symmetry between firm 1 and n, pn =  p’ is a best reply for firm n against pn_ x =  p‘ . ■
We may now state the main result of this section :
\
P R O P O S IT IO N  1. For the n-firm symmetric case, if  there exists any price equi­
libria, it is unique and equal to (p‘ , ■ ■ ■ , p"). -
Proof. By Lemma 6 , if there exists any price equilibria, (p", • • • ,p‘ ) is one of them. 
Then by Lemma l(ii), we know that p =  p" so that Lemma 2 applies, which concludes 
the proof.
4. T H E  T H R E E -F IR M  A SY M M E TR IC  CASE
Now we leave the realm of symmetry to consider a situation with three firms 
asymmetrically located on the linear market [0, L]. As we shall see in the sequel some 
price equilibria can then appear involving market shares which no longer coincide 
with the natural markets. It is in accordance with intuition that, among the three, an 
exterior firm with a very large natural market could be induced, at an equilibrium, 
to serve only the customers located far apart from its rivals, at a high price, rather 
than engage in price competition with other firms in an attempt to keep its whole 
natural market. As for the two remaining sellers, however, Bertrand-like competition 
enforces their prices to descend to the level which induces no search. This leads to an 
equilibrium price configuration with one exterior firm quoting a rather high price and 
the two remaining firms announcing p". Of course this does not preclude another type 




























































































We shall show that those two types of equilibria, in fact, exhaust all the possibil­
ities. The two types of price configurations thereby resulting are depicted in Figures 
5 and 6 .
Figure 5
To proceed more rigorously, denote by p\2 (resp. p23 ) the reservation price of 
the customer located at the border between Ai and A 2 (resp. Ao and A3 ), i.e. 
P12 =  Pi(* 12) (resp. P03 =  p2(t23)). In general p\2 and p23 need not coincide, the only 
exception occuring when the two exterior firms are symmetrically located around the 
interior firm 2 , i.e. when xo — £1 =  X3 — xo.
The following proposition characterizes the two types of equilibrium we have just 
described :
P R O P O S IT IO N  2. Let (pï.p^Pà) ke a Prjce equilibrium, then it is of one o f  the 
two following types :
type 1 (pI.P2 .P3 ) =  (pi2 .P i2 .PAr3)] or (Pm i ,p53 , p53)]
type 2 (P1 .P2 .P3) =  (Pi2 .P i2 .P23) [ or (pi2 .P23 .P23)]-
Proof. We proceed, again, by elimination. Notice, to start, that we cannot have 
P2 < P3 and P2 < Pi simultaneously, since otherwise a price increase by firm 2 
increases its profits, a contradiction. Accordingly, one of the following two cases must 
occur : (a) p2 = p\, or (b) p2 = p3. If the first case applies we must have p\ =  p2 =  p\2 
and in the second we must have p2 = p3 =  p23. In case (a) firm 3 must quote either 
P3 =  P23> or t̂s “rnonopoly price” P3 = PM3 , for only one of these two prices can 




























































































quote p\ = p h  or its “monopoly price” , p[ = p \n ,  for exactly the same reason.
Figure 6
Notice that even the price equilibria at which no firm quotes a monopoly price, 
type 2 equilibria, involve price dispersion -  except for the particular case in which 
p\n — P03 . The presence of price dispersion constitutes the main difference between 
the asymmetric and the symmetric case. The other difference is that, in equilibria of 
type 1 , one observes that some consumers do engage in search, a phenomenon that 
never occurs with symmetric locations.
5. E X IS T E N C E  OF EQ U ILIB R IA
So far we have limited ourselves to the problems of characterizing the nature of 
price equilibria, without posing the problem of its existence. Thus it is natural to 
provide some examples in which this question can be answered. This approach leads 
us first to specify the information costs as a function of distance, and the beliefs of 
the consumers about the unknown prices. This will allow us to derive the reservation 
prices of p"(<) of the consumers and, accordingly, the demand functions to the firms 
corresponding to these specifications.
For a consumer t, consider the distance dj(t) defined by
di(0 = l‘ - * j l,
which expresses the distance between consumer t and firm j. Furthermore assume 
that the information cost Cj(t) to be paid by a consumer t £  A j  for knowing the price 
pj is defined by
c,(<) =  c | ( - i yr




























































































Concerning the beliefs of the consumers, we shall assume that the customers’ 
expectations about any unknown price, pj, are represented by the uniform probability 
function F(p) = p defined over the range of possible prices, taken to be equal to the 
unit interval [0,1].
Consequently, all consumers have identical uniform expectations with respect to 
all firms’ prices.
Let pj denote the price quoted by firm j  and consider a consumer t in the natural 
market ,4,-. The expected gain <Pj,k(pj,t) for consumer t from searching at firm k, 
k =  j  +  1 or k =  j  — 1, when knowing p;- in his own natural market, is given by
v i A P i ' t ) = Pi -  [! -  F (Pj)i(Pi+ ci< -
-  f  [p+.c|( -  xt\c‘}f[p)dp 
Jo
where f(p) denotes the uniform density corresponding to F{p).
Given our assumptions, the above expression reduces to 
[Pj.k(Pj,t) -  y - c l t - n l 0 .
The reservation price pj(<) of consumer t can then be computed from the condi­
tion that the expected gain is equal to zero, i.e. V’j.fcCpjCOiO =  0, or, in our example,
Pj( t)=  (5.1)
Let us now consider successively the problem of existence of equilibria in the 
frame of the above example, first for the n-firm symmetric case and then for the 
three-firm asymmetric case.
5.1. T he n-firm  sym m etric  case
When firms are located symmetrically on (0, L\, the highest price p* at which no 




























































































which, from symmetry, reduces to
p- = x/2 c( I /(2 f.)]<>. (5.2)
We know from Proposition 1 that if an equilibrium exists, all firms must quote p* at 
equilibrium. On the other hand, by Lemma 1 in Section 3. if (p“ . • • •, p") is a price 
equilibrium, then p* must be equal to p =  maxy=i i ..in{p,v/j}. So let us compute the 
value of p for our particular example, so as to compare it with the value of p‘ as given 
by (5.2).
The profit function for firm 1, ^ (p i )  on the range ]p ',p max] when all other firms 
quote p ' is given by
n (p i)  = p  i
31 f  p \ v ‘ 
2 n \ V 2 c )
The first order condition for a maximum in ]p” , pmax] is given by 3L/(2n)—(pi/2)2/ ° ( l+  




Obviously, by symmetry among firms 1 and n, axgmaxx^px) =  argmax;rn(pn).
For an interior firm j ,  it is easy to check that the demand to such a firm at price 
Pj is equal to twice the demand to firm 1 at the same price, minus the length L/n  of 
the natural market, i.e.
Dj(pj) =  2r12(pj) -  L/n.
Using the first order condition for a maximum of *j(pj) =  P;[2n2(Pj) -  L/n], one 
obtains
argmaXp j e ] p - , p B,. ,]*rj ( P j )  =  '/Sc
2 L /n  
1 +  2/cr
a/2
;  =  2, - . n - l . (5.4)
By comparison of (5.3) with (5.4) it is clear that either p = p' or p =
a / 2
Thus, according to Proposition 1 and Lemma 4 (p“, • • • ,p’ ) is a price equilibrium 
if, and only if, p =  p‘ , i.e. p’ =  \/2c[(L/2n)]a > \/2c [ i^o /a] > an inequality which 
reduces to




























































































Hence, the analysis of Section 3 for the symmetric case is relevant for our specifi­
cation, at least as long as the cost of information is not “too” increasing with distance.
p" is beaten by the incentive to exploit the lack of information of those consumers in 
their natural markets which are far apart from their rivals. When such an incentive 
prevails the equilibrium (p ', •• • ,p") is destroyed and no other equilibrium exists.
5.2. T he three-firm  asym m etric  case
We turn now to the analysis of the three-firm asymmetric case for the same 
example. To simplify, however, we particularize it further by assuming that the 
information cost parameters c and a take up the values 2  and ^ respectively, so that
Furthermore, we fix the locations for firms 1 and 3 at xi = 5  and x$ =  10. Then
the location xo of the interior firm. In particular, we shall identify in the (x2 , L)-plane 
the loci of points to which type 1 or type 2 equilibria correspond (see Proposition 3) 
and those to which no equilibria correspond.
Let (pî > p2, P3 ) be an equilibrium of type 1, as characterized in Proposition 3, say 
(pî ) P2 > P3) =  (p.v/ 11P23 > P23 ) ■
Applying (5.1) to the consumer to3 located at the border between the natural 
markets Ao and A3 , we obtain
where the last equality follows from the parameter values we have just specified. Now
In the opposite case the incentive of firms to keep their natural market by quoting
Ci(t) = 2|*-.zfc|*.
we study the set of price equilibria as a function of the length of the market, L, and of
we compute pa/ i . The profit function of firm 1 is tti(p i ) =  p ir 12(pi) =  pi





























































































One can show that, to be an equilibrium, (PA/1 .P23 . P23) =  ( 2  ( ^ p ) ,2 l/M ,
^ 4) must verify the following set of conditions : (i) §^p|p. > 0 , (ii)
< 0 , and (iii) . < 0 .— '  ' <?P3 1 p̂ r —
These conditions translate in the following set of inequalities : (i) 5a: 1 > 3xo; (ii) 
1 1 x 2 < 15x3; (iii) 2 L < 5x3 — 3 x2 , which delimit in the (xo, X)-plane the region of 
(xo, L) values to which corresponds an equilibrium of type 1 with firm 1 quoting p,\n-
Performing a similar analysis for the equilibria of type 1 in which firm 3 quotes 
Pm 3 would lead to another set of similar inequalities. All these inequalities taken 
together delimit in the (xo, T)-plane the region of (xo, L) values to which corresponds 
a price equilibrium of type 1. This region is represented on Figure 7 by the shaded 
area (T) (recall that we have fixed xx =  5 and x3 = 10).
Applying the same methodology for identifying the set of (xo.L) values to which a 
price equilibrium of type 2 corresponds, we represent on Figure 7 this set by the 
shaded area (2). The complement of the unions of areas (T) and (2) is the set of ( r i ,  L ) 




























































































As a conclusion, we notice that for the same information cost function the various 
types of equilibria can occur as a function of the asymmetries in the locations of firms.
6. C O N C LU SIO N
In the case of a homogeneous product and if all consumers have perfect knowl­
edge of prices, Bertrand competition drives down the price to the level of marginal 
cost. However there are many reasons why consumers do not enjoy from perfect in­
formation. To the extent that they are often located far away from the vendors, it is 
not easy for them to have at each instant a clear view of the market. Probably they 
catch some fragmentary aspects of it, based on past experience, or other information 
channels. On the other hand information diffusion is the more difficult, the further is 
the emission’s souce of this information : it seems easy to know the prices prevailing 
in shops close to our living place, but it is more difficult to identify prices in shops 
located far away from our usual walking paths.
In the present paper we have tried to characterize price equilibria resulting from 
interfirm competition when buyers have imperfect knowledge of prices used by the 
merchants who are apart from them. We have shown that, in the case of two firms 
or where n firms are symmetrically located along a linear market, a price equilibrium 
is fully characterized by the highest among the prices which induces no search from 
any consumer : at that price, each seller keep all the customers in his natural mar­
ket. The analysis of the three firms asymmetric case reveals however that this result 
relies heavily on the symmetry assumption. If the sizes of the natural markets are 
sufficiently different, a new type of equilibrium may appear, involving price dispersion 
and search. In that case an exterior firm may prefer to abandon to his neighbor some 
customers close to the border of his natural market, in view of capturing a higher 
surplus from those customers who are far apart from him. The above characteriza­
tion of equilibria was obtained under the assumption that price equilibria did exist. 
In Section 5, we have checked on a particular example that there are, indeed, market 
situations in which this situation occurs.
The present model could probably be extended by making explicit the idea that 
the diffusion of information is more difficult, the further is the economic agent from 
the source where this information is emitted. Hopefully a similar characterization of 
price equilibria would emerge. Another possible extension would take into account 




























































































information cost rather than the customers. These extensions are beyond the scope 
of the present paper, but could constitute a fruitful territory for further research.
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